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“Unlike other disaster sites we have been told about, we would not be an island of destruction in a 
sea of resources (Newcastle 1989, Loma Prieta 1989, Northridge 1994)—Wellington would be an 
island of destruction in a sea, full stop.”  David Middleton, EQC General Manager, 1995. 
 
Back in 1995, EQC and the Centre for Advanced Engineering hosted a conference called “Wellington 
After the Quake:  The Challenge of Rebuilding Cities”.  The scenario for everyone to consider was a 
7.5M earthquake in Wellington leading to 1600 dead, hundreds of commercial buildings damaged or 
collapsed, 3000 uninhabitable homes, and major damage to roads, bridges, and other lifelines.  It all 
sounds eerily familiar. 
 
I wasn’t there at the conference and hadn’t been involved in the field of disaster preparation or 
response until I began a project on disaster waste management in 2009, so I cannot say I’m an 
expert on this topic.  After February, I felt I had to learn about what Christchurch would likely face in 
the next 5-10 years, and so decided to read this book.  Maybe the viewpoint of a fringe player in this 
field would be of enough interest to others that I decided to tie together my gleanings from the 
conference proceedings.  
 
How well did we pay attention to what people said at the conference?  My answer would be that 
we’re doing pretty well at learning lessons, except for the key one, which was that we should have 
done more planning of how to recover, and not just respond, after an earthquake.   
 
Planning after a disaster is too late because it is so much more difficult to reach social agreement 
afterwards.  Steven French of Georgia Tech Univ. made this point at the conference and noted that, 
especially after earthquakes, long delays in recovery can result from attempts to come up with 
rebuilding plans, and all because people try to solve not only the recovery problem but to also fix 
problems perceived to have existed before the disaster.  Large changes in urban layout, design, and 
philosophy are made more difficult, not easier, by the disaster.  Earthquakes in particular (in contrast 
to, say, cyclones) leave a patchwork of remaining buildings that will make wholesale change costly.  
In addition, the high emotions and social tensions resulting from a disaster make it more difficult, 
not easier, to bring about social change.  Changing the form of a city means changing its roads, 
sewers, and power systems, but even with major infrastructure damage, the additional cost of 
shifting to new places or methods is far too high, and would come at a time when funds are critically 
needed elsewhere.  What I took from this analysis was that to an extent not appreciated, we should 
look to rebuild, and afterwards enter into discussion about change. 
 
One of the critical drivers that limit change during recovery is the need to reinstate commercial and 
industrial activity as quickly as possible.  Steven French emphasised creative approaches that were 
taken after the Northridge earthquake to get commerce active again, including shopping bazaars in 
local parks.  Commercial activity can benefit from small changes instituted with a rebuild and he 
gives the example of Santa Cruz where the rebuilt area was more attractive to shoppers.  Similarly 
the creation of open space along riverbanks because of past liquefaction can be included to enhance 
commercial activity. 
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Another speaker, Christopher Henri from the Insurance Council of Australia, brought up a related 
point about planning after a disaster, based on his experiences in Darwin after the 1974 cyclone.  
The Reconstruction Commission there decided not to develop a new City Plan, which would take too 
long, or to enforce the old City Plan, with its exposed inadequacies and irrelevance to a new setting.  
Instead, the Commission brought in a number of ways to encourage or discourage certain practices, 
rather than setting new rules or making long-lasting decisions on particular land use applications.  
This gave them flexibility and also gave individual land owners and businesses an ability to be 
creative in their response.  Over time, as decisions were made and it became clearer through a series 
of case-by-case decisions which landuses were appropriate where and under what conditions, I 
would imagine that the City would codify common practice into a new city plan.  This flexibility and 
emphasis on outcomes rather than methods would seem a good way forward during a recovery. 
 
A number of the speakers brought up problems of delay during a recovery.  The inter-governmental 
squabble over historic buildings after Loma Prieta led to long delays, and also wasted administrative 
effort.  Which buildings to save?  To what standard should the repair be conducted? Who would 
pay?  An agreed policy in advance of the event could have saved years of meetings, consultant 
reports, court cases, and delays.  Hopefully, NZ TLAs are moving in this direction now.  After the 
cyclone hit Darwin, the slow deliberations over what the new Building Code should be led to overall 
recovery delays.  Although we cannot plan to revise a building code only after death and destruction, 
we can be ready to incorporate new knowledge quickly, and IPENZ has led the way in doing so here.   
 
The one case study of delays in the book that haunted me the most was of the 1987 Whittier 
earthquake in the Los Angeles Basin, where a 5.9M shallow earthquake hit in a highly urbanised 
area.  Recovery there went extremely slowly, to allow for a comprehensive plan of the land use and 
character of redevelopment.  In addition to the problem of no pre-earthquake plan for 
redevelopment, and the problem of delays arising from the time required to develop a detailed, 
prescriptive plan afterwards, Whittier had problems with slow approvals of building permits, 
shortage of administrative staff, debates over historic buildings, and a general shortage of labour 
needed for recovery.  The delays led to lawsuits, which led to further delays. 
 
Labour issues are mentioned a number of times in the book as significant bottlenecks in recovery 
programmes.  Early on, the accommodation of recovery workers can be a major issue.  Earthquakes 
are likely to hit lower-income housing disproportionally, decreasing the availability of short-term 
accommodation for workers.  Tony Lanigan, a management consultant, looked at all the potential 
labour, material, and equipment bottlenecks in the 1995 Wellington recovery scenario, and 
considered accommodation of labour to be the most critical.  Frank Holmes, then Director of the 
Bank of New Zealand, highlighted a need for government to change its  “… training programmes and 
immigration policies to ease potential shortages of labour…” and so preserve “… reasonable stability 
of prices”.  These issues of labour quantity and quality and inflation impacts are likely to become 
greater issues as rebuilding gains momentum.  There is plenty for the new CERA to worry about! 
 
But at least we have a CERA.  A number of the conference participants discussed the difficulties that 
have arisen when there has been no central authority responsible for recovery.  Having one central 
authority can prevent some of the inter-institutional paralysis, delays and excess costs in recovery.  
However, these central authorities still need to be receptive to the public and to communicate 
effectively.  Without care, the tension between acting quickly and communicating effectively is 
bound to snap.  In Darwin, a Citizen Advisory Council was established that bypassed elected officials 
and received direct input from residents, and it was found to be effective.  Another response that 
caught my attention was in relation to the 1989 Newcastle earthquake.  Henri describes the 
development and distribution of a report entitled “Factors influencing structural behaviour of 
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residential buildings in Newcastle”.  Providing this document to all builders, structural engineers, and 
insurance inspectors, as well as to interested building owners proved very useful.  Before its release, 
a large number of misunderstandings and inconsistencies in explanations had increased social 
tension. For example, a houseowner would wonder why their house had been assessed as having 
only $10,000 of damage, while the neighbours had been assessed as a total loss.  The need for 
information related to complex technical decision-making on the status of buildings will remain 
strong in Christchurch for many years. 
 
Peter Yanev, of what is now the risk assessment firm ABS Consulting, estimated that 50% of the 
insurance payout after the Northridge earthquake was, in effect, insurance fraud.  Policy owners 
claimed for damage that was not due to the earthquake, and the cost of ‘repairs’ was more than the 
minimum required.  If this is a precedent, New Zealand is about to see some friction between 
insurance companies and EQC on the one side and building owners on the other.  The need for 
proper cost control systems and clear communication will be very high.  I do not want a job handling 
insurance claims anytime soon. 
 
The other eye-opener from the insurance industry related to how poorly premiums match the 
underlying risk from natural disasters.  Peter Yanev noted how many insurance companies offering 
earthquake cover quoted similar rates independent of how the sub-surface risk varied.  He provided 
a number of details from the Northridge earthquake on how his company had done better 
compared with others in terms of payouts.  His company had years previously begun selling 
earthquake insurance to those they thought were safer than most, undercutting the cost of the 
broad-brush insurers.  They looked at detailed geotechnical assessments, considering the distance to 
known faults, the soil condition, and the geology.  Their method is so obvious, and maybe things 
have changed since 1995, but it still leads to the question, why isn’t this common practice?  Surely it 
would make sense for society to assess, pre-disaster, the site’s risk and also the ability of the 
building to withstand a disaster load, and charge insurance accordingly. 
 
I think much of the answer lies in the role today of ‘re-insurers’.  Reinsurers insure the insurance 
companies against very large payouts on rare events such as earthquakes.  From the viewpoint of 
the insurance company, there is little incentive to pay the extra cost in assessing risk when they 
know that in any large disaster they will pay the same amount, and the re-insurance company will 
pay the extra associated with their having made poor estimates of risk.  On the other hand, there’s 
no doubt that re-insurers pay great attention to the risk and that they conduct detailed 
investigations using the latest science and technology.  Werner Schaad from Swiss Re provided a 
detailed examination of the cost of a major earthquake in Wellington.  What he did not make clear 
was whether re-insurers would charge insurance companies less if they issued more risk-dependent 
insurance policies.  In the end, if the economic signal of risk does not make its way to the property 
owner, we are just setting ourselves up for paying more as a society for every disaster. 
 
At some point, we need to turn hindsight into foresight.  The conference back in 1995 put a great 
deal of effort into helping Wellington prepare for its future ‘big one’.  In some ways, it’s an excusable 
failure of imagination to institute policies in a country when it has not had a disaster before of the 
scale that was envisioned for Wellington back in 1995.  It is even more excusable that Christchurch 
did not have a detailed earthquake recovery plan in place pre-disaster.  From now on, what will be 
much more difficult to excuse would be other parts of New Zealand not planning now for a future 
disaster, and being left instead with rubble, damaged citizens and a slow, difficult recovery. 
 
